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Market Makers & Liquidity

Crypto Market Makers: How They Work, Who the Big Ones Are and What They Charge

What a crypto market maker does, how it makes money, the KPIs to put in a contract (spread, 2% depth, uptime), retainer vs token loan and call option deals with a worked example, what Wintermute, GSR, Keyrock, DWF Labs and others disclose, documented enforcement and a red flag checklist.

Crypto Market Makers: How They Work, Who the Big Ones Are and What They Charge – featured image, cryptoinfrastructure.io
TL;DR summary

A crypto market maker is a trading firm that keeps buy and sell orders on an exchange order book at the same time, so other traders can trade without moving the price much. It earns the gap between its bid and ask (the spread), plus exchange rebates. It carries the risk of holding tokens whose price moves. Token teams hire market makers on two main models: a fixed retainer, or a token loan plus call options. None of the firms reviewed here publish a price, so fees are quote-based. Before you sign, write spread, depth within 2% of mid price and uptime targets into the contract, demand venue-verifiable reports and know the enforcement record: in October 2024 the SEC charged three so-called market makers with selling wash trading as a service.

If you run a token project or a young exchange, you have probably been told you “need a market maker” before a listing. The pitch decks all say the same thing about deep liquidity and tight spreads, and almost none say what the firm will actually do, what it will cost, or how you will know whether it delivered. This guide is written for token teams and exchange operators who are about to buy the service. It explains how crypto market making works, the numbers that belong in a contract, the two deal structures (with a worked loan and option example), what the best-known firms say about themselves and what regulators have on record, the enforcement cases you should know plus a red flag and contract checklist.

What is a crypto market maker?

A crypto market maker is a firm that continuously quotes both a price to buy (the bid) and a price to sell (the ask) for a token on one or more exchanges, so that anyone who wants to trade finds an order waiting. That standing liquidity narrows the bid-ask spread and reduces slippage, the price movement a trader causes when an order eats through the book.

What the definition leaves out is the commercial side. For a token issuer, a market maker is a contracted supplier. You are buying a service level (how tight, how deep, how often) and the firm is taking a trading position in your token to deliver it. Those two facts drive everything else in this guide.

Designated market makers vs. principal trading firms

Some firms trade a token only when it suits their own book. Others sign a contract with a token team or an exchange to quote continuously against agreed targets. XBTO, which sells market making, calls the second kind a designated market maker (DMM) and contrasts it with discretionary principal traders that can pull back under stress. When people ask “what is a market maker in stock trading”, the closest equivalent is this contracted role: a firm with obligations to keep quotes on screen, not just a large trader.

Market makers vs. market takers

On an exchange, a maker is any order that rests on the book (a limit order that does not fill immediately) and a taker is any order that fills against a resting order. Market makers are makers almost by definition. Exchanges usually charge makers less than takers; some pay makers a rebate. Kraken’s market maker page, for example, advertises “maker fees as low as -0.02% on eligible spot pairs”, meaning the exchange pays the maker on qualifying trades. Those incentives change: Kraken has removed pairs from its spot maker rebate programme (TradeInformer) and keeps a separate list of eligible pairs, so check it rather than assume a rebate applies. Takers pay for immediacy; makers are paid for waiting.

Automated market makers (AMMs)

On decentralised exchanges, an automated market maker replaces the order book with a smart contract pool: liquidity providers deposit two tokens and a pricing formula sets the rate. Professional firms also work here, supplying pool liquidity or quoting on on-chain order books. The economics differ (pool fees instead of spread, plus the risk of losing value against simply holding the tokens), but the buyer’s question is the same: how much usable liquidity do you get and who controls the inventory?

How market making works

Spread capture

The basic trade is simple. The firm bids slightly below the fair price and offers slightly above it. If one trader sells to its bid and another buys from its ask, the firm earns the difference. A plain example with round numbers: bid $0.99, ask $1.01, so a $0.02 spread. If the firm buys 10,000 tokens at $0.99 and sells 10,000 at $1.01, the gross spread captured is $200, before exchange fees or rebates.

Inventory risk

Real flows are never balanced. If sellers keep hitting the bid, the firm accumulates tokens while the price falls. That is inventory risk. It is the main way market makers lose money. Firms manage it by skewing quotes (lowering both bid and ask to attract buyers), hedging on other venues or in derivatives where they exist and limiting position size. Keyrock describes this as maintaining “delta-neutral strategies”. For a small-cap token with no derivatives market, hedging is hard, which is one reason illiquid tokens cost more to support and why loan structures are common.

Adverse selection

The other risk is trading with someone who knows more: an informed trader who buys just before news, or an arbitrageur who hits a stale quote after the price moved elsewhere. Firms widen spreads or cut size when they suspect this, which is exactly when your token’s liquidity looks worst.

How do crypto market makers make money?

A market maker’s revenue comes from four places:

  • Spread capture: the gap between buy and sell prices, earned over many trades.
  • Exchange rebates and incentives: negative maker fees and programme incentives such as the ones Kraken lists (rebates, credit lines, warrants).
  • Fees from token teams or exchanges: a retainer for the service.
  • Option value: under loan and option deals, the profit from buying your tokens below market price if the price ends above the strike.

How much they make is not public for the large private firms reviewed here. No reliable industry-wide figure is published. The one documented number for a single firm comes from a criminal case: Gotbit, a self-described market maker, received “tens of millions of dollars in proceeds for its services” and agreed to forfeit about $23 million in cryptocurrency when it and its founder pleaded guilty (as reported on 21 March 2025). That is a figure for a firm that sold wash trading, not a benchmark for honest market making.

The numbers that belong in your contract

A market making agreement is only as good as its measurable targets. These are the KPIs the firms and guides reviewed here name, with what each one means in practice:

KPIWhat it measuresHow to write it
Maximum spreadThe gap between best bid and best ask, in basis points (1 bp = 0.01%)“No more than X bps at an order size of Y” per pair and venue, so a tiny quote cannot satisfy it
Depth at 2% (also 1% or 5%)The total value of bids within 2% below mid price and of asks within 2% above itA minimum on each side, in USD or in tokens (say which), per venue. Keyrock’s guide uses the 2% range to assess where liquidity is needed
UptimeThe share of time the spread and depth targets are both metA percentage over a defined window (per day or per month). Keyrock says market makers “should typically commit to maintaining 95%+ uptime”; DWF Labs advertises “95% minimum uptime” (both)
Venues and pairsWhere the service appliesA named list of exchanges and trading pairs, plus who pays any exchange onboarding costs
ReportingProof of performanceDaily or weekly reports with order-level data you can check against exchange data, not screenshots
VolumeTrades executedDo not make volume a target. A firm paid for volume has a reason to trade with itself, which is the conduct the SEC charged in 2024

Uptime figures are the firms’ own published service claims, not independently measured performance.

Deal structures: retainer vs. loan and call option

XBTO’s own buyer checklist contrasts a “loan + option model” with retainer models but does not explain either. Here is how each works and what it does to the firm’s incentives.

Retainer model

You pay a fixed monthly fee for an agreed service level. Usually you also provide the inventory (tokens and often stablecoins for the bid side) in an account the firm trades, or the firm uses its own capital. Your cost is visible and the firm’s pay does not depend on your token price. The trade-offs: you fund the fee in cash; if you supply the inventory, trading losses on that inventory can fall on you depending on the contract. Ask who bears losses, who keeps profits and whether inventory sits in an account you can see.

Token loan plus call option model

You lend the market maker a quantity of tokens for a fixed term. It uses them (with its own stablecoins) to quote on both sides. At the end of the term it either returns the tokens or exercises call options, the right to buy some or all of them at agreed strike prices. There is little or no cash fee; the firm is paid through the options.

Worked example (hypothetical)

Illustrative assumptions only. The token, quantities and prices are invented to show the mechanics and are not market rates:

  • Loan: 2,000,000 tokens for 12 months.
  • Call options on the full amount, in three equal tranches of about 666,667 tokens, with strikes of $0.50, $0.75 and $1.00.
  • At the end of the term the market maker either pays the strike for a tranche (and keeps those tokens) or returns them.
Token price at expiryTranches exercisedCash paid to the token teamTokens returnedMarket maker’s gain on options
$0.40None$02,000,000$0
$0.80$0.50 and $0.75666,667 × $0.50 + 666,667 × $0.75 = about $833,334About 666,6661,333,334 tokens worth about $1,066,667, less $833,334 paid = about $233,333
$1.50All three666,667 × ($0.50 + $0.75 + $1.00) = about $1,500,00102,000,000 tokens worth $3,000,000, less about $1,500,001 = about $1,499,999

Two things follow. First, the market maker’s pay rises with your token price, so its incentive is tied to the price, not just to quality of service. Second, while the firm holds 2,000,000 of your tokens, it can sell them. If it sells a large part early and the price falls below every strike, it can buy tokens back cheaper to return them and keep the difference. Unless the contract limits net selling, nothing in the structure prevents that outcome. Flovtec, itself a market maker, warns buyers against “aggressive option-based compensation”. This is why the contract checklist below asks for sell limits, inventory reporting and strike levels set with care. Your tokenomics should also show the loan as a separate allocation, because those tokens can reach the market.

Hybrid

Some deals mix a smaller retainer with a smaller loan and option package, or switch from one model to the other after launch. Judge a hybrid on the same questions: who owns the inventory, what the firm can sell and what it earns if the price rises.

What do crypto market makers charge?

None of the firms reviewed here (Wintermute, GSR, Jump Crypto, Cumberland, Amber Group, Keyrock, Flowdesk, DWF Labs) publishes a retainer, fee schedule or standard option terms on its website. DWF Labs and Keyrock direct prospects to contact them, and Keyrock describes “tailored agreements fitting their budget requirements”. Pricing is quote-based.

The only published or documented figures are:

FigureWhat it isSource
Maker fees as low as -0.02%What an exchange pays makers on eligible spot pairs, not what a token team pays a market makerKraken market maker page
95% minimum uptimeA service commitment, not a priceDWF Labs market making page
“Tens of millions of dollars” in proceeds; about $23 million forfeitedWhat one firm (Gotbit) earned from wash trading clients, 2018 to 2024Guilty plea coverage, 21 March 2025

Any article quoting a “typical” monthly retainer without a source is guessing. Get at least two written quotes on the same KPI table so they are comparable, and price a loan deal by its option terms, not just by the absence of a cash fee.

Who are the biggest crypto market makers?

There is no public league table of crypto market makers. The firms below are the names that recur across the pages ranking for this search. Each is described from its own website and from regulatory records. Size claims are the firms’ own and are not audited.

FirmWhat it says it doesRegistrations stated or on recordEnforcement or reported issues
WintermuteLiquidity for token issuers and an OTC desk for spot and derivativesUK entity registered with the FCA for cryptoasset activities under the money laundering rules (FRN 928764), per its site; the same site says neither Wintermute entity is “authorised or regulated by any regulatory authority”None on record
GSRMarket making for projects and exchanges since 2013; claims 60+ exchange integrations and over $1 trillion tradedUS entity licensed as a money services business where it operates (NMLS 2318094); UK entity FCA-registered; Singapore entity a Major Payment Institution under MAS, per its siteNone on record
Jump CryptoTrading, open-source infrastructure and investmentNone stated on its siteSubsidiary Tai Mo Shan settled SEC charges for about $123 million, December 2024 (below)
Cumberland (DRW)Institutional OTC liquidity, listed and OTC options and forwardsNone stated on its siteSEC unregistered dealer case, October 2024, reported dismissed March 2025 (below)
Amber GroupDescribes itself as “a top liquidity provider” to projects and institutionsNone stated on its siteNone on record
KeyrockMarket making since 2017; claims 85+ exchanges and 400+ markets; hubs in the EU, UK, Switzerland, Brazil, US and SeychellesNone named on its homepage or market making guideNone on record
FlowdeskLiquidity and OTC for crypto issuers and institutions; claims 150+ venuesSays it is “regulated as a Crypto-Asset Service Provider in Europe under MiCA” without naming the entity or authority; Flowdesk Omega FZE holds VARA licence VL/26/08/001 (Broker-Dealer Services, issued 7 August 2026), per its siteNone on record
DWF LabsMarket making on 80+ centralised and decentralised venues; claims 1,000+ projectsNone stated on its market making pageMay 2024 media reports of a Binance internal investigation (below), which DWF Labs denied

Registrations as stated on each firm’s own site in October 2026; register entries change, so confirm them on the regulator’s register before you contract. A registration for anti-money-laundering purposes (such as UK FCA registration) is not the same as authorisation to provide a regulated market making service. Check the regulator’s own register for the entity you will contract with, because group websites list several entities.

Enforcement and reported cases you should know

SEC v. Gotbit, ZM Quant and CLS Global (October 2024)

On 9 October 2024 the SEC charged three “so-called market makers”, ZM Quant, Gotbit and CLS Global, along with employees and five token promoters who hired them. The SEC said the promoters bought “market-manipulation-as-a-service”: the firms allegedly traded with themselves (wash trading) on popular platforms, and their bots “generated quadrillions of transactions and billions of dollars of artificial trading volume each day” (SEC press release 2024-166). ZM Quant and CLS Global allegedly manipulated a token created at the FBI’s direction as part of a parallel investigation. In March 2025 Gotbit and its founder Aleksei Andriunin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit market manipulation and wire fraud, admitting wash trading for client tokens from 2018 to 2024 (as reported on 21 March 2025). This case is also covered in the guide to starting a crypto exchange, because the same “volume” offers reach new exchanges.

Tai Mo Shan (Jump Crypto) and TerraUSD (December 2024)

On 20 December 2024 the SEC announced that Tai Mo Shan, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jump Crypto Holdings, would pay about $123 million ($73,452,756 disgorgement, $12,916,153 prejudgment interest and a $36,726,378 civil penalty) to settle charges. The SEC found that when TerraUSD (UST) lost its peg in May 2021, Tai Mo Shan bought more than $20 million of UST in return for Terraform vesting its existing option to buy LUNA at a discount, and “acted negligently by trading UST in a manner that deceived the market” into believing the algorithm had restored the peg (SEC press release 2024-212). Tai Mo Shan settled without admitting or denying the findings. The lesson for buyers: a market maker’s option terms with a project can shape how it trades.

Cumberland DRW (October 2024, reported dismissed 2025)

On 10 October 2024 the SEC sued Cumberland DRW, alleging it acted as an unregistered dealer in more than $2 billion of crypto assets it said were securities (SEC press release 2024-169). This was a registration case, not a manipulation case. The SEC’s dismissal of the case with prejudice was reported in March 2025 as part of a wider withdrawal of crypto cases.

DWF Labs (reported, May 2024)

On 9 May 2024 the Wall Street Journal reported that Binance had fired a member of its market surveillance team after the team reported that DWF Labs, a Binance client, had manipulated several tokens through about $300 million of wash trades in 2023. Binance said the allegations were not “fully substantiated”; DWF Labs called them “unfounded” (CoinDesk summary of the WSJ report). These are reported allegations from an internal investigation; no regulatory finding against DWF Labs has been published.

Alameda Research and FTX (2022)

Alameda Research was one of the best-known crypto market makers until FTX collapsed. In charging Sam Bankman-Fried on 13 December 2022, the SEC alleged that Alameda had a “virtually unlimited ‘line of credit’ funded by the platform’s customers” and was exempted from “certain key FTX risk mitigation measures” (SEC press release 2022-219). For exchange operators, the point is structural: a market maker affiliated with the venue, or given special treatment by it, is a conflict that customers and regulators will ask about.

Red flags when hiring a market maker

  • Volume as the product. Offers priced on daily volume, “trending” placement or chart patterns. That is what the SEC described as market manipulation as a service.
  • No KPIs in writing. “Deep liquidity” without spread, depth at 2% and uptime targets per venue.
  • Unverifiable reports. Screenshots instead of order-level data you can check against the exchange.
  • Uncapped selling of loaned tokens. A loan deal with no limit on net selling, no inventory reporting and strikes set close to the launch price.
  • Vague entities. A brand name with no contracting entity, or a licence claim with no register entry you can find.
  • Promises about price. Any firm that talks about where your token price will go, rather than about spreads and depth, is selling something else.
  • Introductions through promoters or KOLs bundled with “market support”. In the 2024 SEC case the promoters hired the market makers.

Contract checklist

  1. Parties: the exact legal entity, its jurisdiction and its register entries, checked on the regulator’s site.
  2. Scope: named venues and pairs, start date, term and onboarding responsibilities.
  3. KPIs: maximum spread at a stated size, minimum depth at 2% (and 1% or 5% if relevant) on each side in a stated currency, uptime percentage and how it is measured.
  4. Prohibited conduct: no self-trading or wash trading, no trading between accounts the firm controls, compliance with each venue’s rules plus a right to terminate if breached.
  5. Inventory: who supplies tokens and stablecoins, where they are held, who bears losses and who keeps profits.
  6. Loan terms (if any): amount, term, strikes and their basis, limits on net selling, return mechanics and what happens on early termination.
  7. Fees: retainer amount and currency, any performance fee and who pays exchange costs.
  8. Reporting: frequency, format and raw data access so you can reconcile against exchange data.
  9. Remedies: fee reductions for missed KPIs, termination rights and return of all loaned tokens on exit.
  10. Disclosure: how the arrangement will appear in your token documents and allocation, and any requirements in your listing agreements.

Have a lawyer who knows the market abuse rules in each market where your token trades review the agreement before you sign.

What this means for you

Hiring a market maker is buying a measurable service from a firm that will hold, and may sell, your tokens. Decide which structure you can live with, put spread, 2% depth and uptime in the contract, insist on data you can verify and check every entity against a regulator’s register rather than its website. The firms’ names matter less than the terms you sign and your ability to check them.

Related reading on this site: how liquidity fits into launching a venue in the guide to starting a crypto exchange; how loan allocations sit in your supply schedule in tokenomics explained; why promoter-led launches carry risk in what a KOL is. Providers are covered in the Market Makers & Liquidity section. How they are assessed is set out in the methodology.

This guide is general information, not legal or financial advice. Market making arrangements and market abuse rules differ by jurisdiction; take advice from a regulated lawyer before you sign. See the site’s disclaimer.

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Owen Maximilian

Owen Maximilian is an editor at Crypto Infrastructure covering exchanges, market makers, liquidity providers and token launchpads, with a focus on where platforms are legal, how they work and the risks users should understand.

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